We report the results of an experiment designed to investigate the behavior of quoted spreads in multiple-dealer markets. We manipulate verbal communication (not allowed and allowed) and order preferencing (not allowed, allowed, and allowed with order-flow payment) between eighteen sessions. Without preferencing, spreads are wider when communication is allowed. With preferencing (and no order-flow payments), individuals do not have incentives to narrow the spread and a wide spread may be maintained without a collusive agreement. However, spreads narrow somewhat when individuals are given the opportunity to compete using alternatives to price (that is, payment for order flow).
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a framework for our subsequent empirical investigation. Section 2 describes the experimental procedures, and Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 offers discussion and concluding remarks.
Framework
In dealer markets, orders are filled at the best bid or ask price. Competition among dealers is thought to produce narrow bid-ask spreads. In a Bertrand equilibrium, competition is expected to drive the spread to the marginal cost of trading (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) . For an actively traded issue on NASDAQ, upwards of 30 dealers participate in determining the spread.
However, Christie and Schultz (1994) and Christie, Harris, and Schultz (1994) allege that dealers in these markets collude to widen spreads. Christie and Schultz report that odd-eighth quotes are almost nonexistent for many actively traded NASDAQ stocks and suggest that NASDAQ market makers implicitly collude to widen spreads. The implicit pricing agreement seems to have fallen apart once Christie and Schultz's findings were reported in national newspapers. Christie, Harris, and Schultz report the sudden and extreme change in spreads for five actively traded issues and the concomitant increase in the use of odd-eighth quotes for these stocks. However, neither study demonstrates that the spreads observed in the NASDAQ market are, in some sense, too wide.
Some have disputed the conclusion that NASDAQ dealers implicitly collude to maintain wide spreads (see e.g., Kleidon and Willig, 1995; and Laux, 1995) . The empirical evidence reported by Kleidon and Willig (1995) suggests that competitive economic factors can explain the frequency of odd-eighth quotes on both NASDAQ and the NYSE. Furthermore, the width of spreads on NASDAQ stocks that frequently quote on even-eighths is no different from that of 4 stocks that frequently quote on odd-eighths (Laux, 1995) . The structure of the NASDAQ market makes collusion extremely difficult to maintain. In particular, market makers face few, if any, barriers to entry, the market includes a large number of market makers with a diversity of incentives, and plausible sanctions for violators of collusive agreements are lacking.
Until a recent article by Huang and Stoll (1996) , no empirical study had clearly established how spreads differ, if at all, across various market structures. Huang and Stoll compare spreads for carefully matched samples of NASDAQ and NYSE firms. They find that spreads are wider for the NASDAQ sample and that the spreads on NASDAQ have increased over time. Many possible sources of the divergence in spreads can be ruled out, notably, differences across firm characteristics and the frequency of odd-eighth price quotes. Huang and Stoll (1996) and Godek (1996) conclude that likely sources for the observed spread patterns are preferencing and internalization in the NASDAQ market. Though preferencing and internalization are also possible on the NYSE, this institutional arrangement is more prevalent on NASDAQ. When orders are preferenced or internalized, the dealer who receives the order fills it at the best inside price quote.
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The result is that dealers have little incentive to narrow the spread. A dealer's share of the order flow cannot be increased by narrowing the spread if most orders are preferenced. Huang and Stoll suggest that the frequency of preferencing has increased over time, though they do not have direct evidence to support this assertion. The evidence reported by Huang and Stoll and Godek suggests that wide spreads on NASDAQ result from the particular market structure, rather than from implicit collusion among market makers.
Models of dealer markets that explicitly consider institutional features of the NASDAQ market have been proposed. Incorporating price discreteness and preferencing, Kandel and Marx (1997a) find that competition does not necessarily drive the spread to the marginal cost of trading.
Instead, the equilibrium spread may not be driven below the marginal cost of trading plus two times the price tick. When preferenced trades are included in their model, market makers have even less incentive to reduce the spread. The use of a focal point, such as even-eighth quotes, as a coordination device permits market makers to choose through interaction over time one of the competitive equilibria without the need for communication. This focal-point equilibrium does not 2 rule out collusion but permits market makers to choose the largest competitive spread and generate profits similar to the profits possible with a collusive agreement. Dutta and Madhaven (1997) show that even dealers who act noncooperatively can set bidask spreads above competitive levels. Institutional features, like order preferencing, are important determinants of the spread. Price discreteness is not required. In addition, their analysis shows that even if dealers fail to compete over price as a result of preferencing, dealers may compete other ways. Non-price competition can take the form of vertical agreements with brokers in which dealers agree to pay brokers for order flow. Importantly, Dutta and Madhavan distinguish implicit from explicit collusion. Implicit collusion occurs when dealers who act noncooperatively accrue abnormal profit whereas explicit collusion suggests cooperation among market makers.
This distinction is critical for policy discussion because implicit collusion is not necessarily illegal.
In this study we directly examine the effects of communication and preferencing on quoted spreads in multiple dealer settings. An experimental economics method allows us to regulate overt communication among dealers and govern institutional features, while isolating the effects of the variables of interest. If dealers are not permitted to communicate verbally and in the absence of preferenced order flow, bid-ask spreads should be determined by competitive forces.
However, if dealers are inclined to overtly collude in setting spreads when permitted to communicate verbally, we expect to observe bid-ask spreads that are wider than predicted under competition. In addition, if preferencing reduces incentives to compete, we expect to find higher spreads in settings with preferencing, regardless of whether dealers are able to communicate.
Finally, if preferencing reduces dealers' incentives to compete on price, we expect to find that dealers are willing to compete on non-price dimensions to attract clients (e.g., through payment for order flow).
Experimental Procedures
We examine bid-ask spreads in six experimental settings. In constructing the settings, we manipulate verbal communication (not allowed and allowed) and preferencing (not allowed, allowed, and allowed with order flow payment). We conduct three sessions for each of the six experimental settings, giving a total of 18 sessions. The design is summarized in Table 1 .
At the beginning of each session participants receive a set of instructions that are read aloud. We recruit participants from third-and fourth-year, undergraduate students in business 3 and economics and M.B.A. students at two universities. Participants have taken at least one finance course, with an average of 3.07 finance courses (including courses in which they are currently enrolled). Thus, participants are aware that stock prices are commonly expressed in ticks and familiar with the concept of bid-ask spread. Four participants take part in each session and all participants are inexperienced in that they have not participated in an earlier session.
Across the 18 sessions, participants earn an average of $30.00 for participating approximately 90 minutes. Each order to buy or sell is for 10 shares except in sessions with payment for order flow.
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In these sessions, participants are instructed that they can pay a "rebate" to their clients in return for their orders and, in turn, increase the orders received. Rebates are reported in increments of one cent per share, can take any nonnegative value, and are set before bid and ask prices are After group members determine bid and ask prices, participants reveal their prices to the group. The best (lowest) ask and (highest) bid prices determine the prices at which orders to buy and sell are filled. In sessions with payment for order flow, all participants also reveal their rebate and the market rebate is determined. Each period the group receives from one to four orders to buy and one to four orders to sell. The number of orders to buy and sell is determined 9 independently and randomly prior to the experimental sessions by the experimenters using uniform distributions. Order prices are randomly and independently determined using the distributions 5 expressed in equations (1) and (2). Participants are informed that they must stand ready to accept offers to sell shares at their bid price and offers to buy shares at their ask price. Orders are always filled at the best bid and ask prices. Orders can go unfilled because the orders are at prices below the market ask or above the market bid.
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In the six sessions without preferencing, orders to buy and sell are filled by the individual(s) with the best bid and ask prices. In the event that two or more participants cooperation in setting rebates. To provide participants with an incentive to respond conscientiously, we pay them $2.00 for completing the questionnaire. 
Results
Panel A of Table 2 Table 3 , indicate that all three independent variables are significant at p < 0.01.
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Because the interaction term is significant, we perform additional analyses to investigate the simple effects of communication and preferencing on the observed spread. First, we examine the simple effect of communication. We perform three ANOVAs where the independent variable is communication and the dependent variable is the spread per period. The results are reported in Panels A, B, and C of Table 4 . Using data from the six sessions in which preferencing is not allowed, we find that communication is significant at p < 0.001. Using data from the six sessions in which preferencing is allowed (with no payment for order flow), we find that communication is not significant at any conventional level (p = 0.213). Finally, using data from the six sessions with preferencing and payment for order flow, we find that communication is significant at p < 0.001.
Hence, communication widens the spread, but only when dealers have incentives to compete using price or an alternative method such as order flow payment.
Next we examine the simple effect of preferencing. We perform two ANOVAs: one using data from the nine sessions with communication and one using data from the nine sessions without communication. In each case, the independent variable is preferencing and the dependent variable is the spread per period. The results, shown in Panels A and B of We also examine participants' responses to a second open-ended question: how would you characterize cooperation observed during the experiment? A sample response from each session is reported in Table 7 . As before, reported responses are representative of the majority of group members in the same session. When preferencing is allowed, some degree of "loose" 
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
We use an experimental economics method to examine the effects of verbal communication and order preferencing on quoted bid-ask spreads in multiple dealer settings. We find that in sessions without order preferencing, spreads are wider when verbal communication is allowed. Participants often overtly collude to widen the spread when given the opportunity to communicate verbally. We find that spreads are even wider in sessions with order preferencing.
With preferencing, participants do not have incentives to narrow the spread because they do not compete for incoming orders. Hence, wide spreads can be maintained without the necessity of collusive agreements. We also find that participants are willing to compete for order flow using cash payments; however, they appear willing to retaliate against those who are "too competitive."
Spreads narrow somewhat when participants are given the opportunity to compete using alternatives to price. Narrow spreads may result because participants attempt to discipline those who quote high order flow payments. In addition, casual observation suggests that competition for order flow using the non-price method spilled over to price competition. The observed waves of competitiveness are deserving of future investigation.
Our data also suggest that in the absence of verbal communication, participants may attempt to coordinate their actions through announced bid and ask prices and order flow payments. Some evidence suggests that coordination occurs in a "loose" sense. Participants quote relatively low bids (high asks) in order to encourage others to decrease (increase) their bid (ask) prices, even when verbal communication is prohibited. And, participants send clear messages regarding high order flow payments by disciplining those who quote them.
The results of this study have important implications concerning the interpretation of earlier studies of dealer behavior. Preferencing and internalization of order flow limit dealers'
incentives to narrow bid-ask spreads. Our data suggest that spreads may be wider on NASDAQ because of the structure of the market, not from collusion among dealers.
Future work can examine how the Securities and Exchange Commission's new rules (e.g., public display of limit orders) affect dealer behavior and observed bid-ask spreads. In addition, future investigations may consider how institutional arrangements affect the distribution of income. For example, order flow payments affect not only profit levels, but who gets the profit.
1. In our experimental settings with preferenced order flow, participants act as both brokers for their clients and market makers. Given that preferencing is used by brokers to reward market makers, we assume that it is in each participant's best interest to direct rewards inwardly. Thus, preferencing and internalization are identical. In the remainder of the paper, we use the term preferencing for convenience to describe the situation that arises when a broker/dealer fills a client's order at the inside spread.
2. In the industrial organization literature, the theory of focal points was introduced by Schelling (1960) . Overt communication in pricing is dangerous with antitrust legislation. The use of a focal point is a subtle way of coordinating pricing decisions without direct communication.
3. The experimental instructions are available from the authors upon request.
4. Orders may be passed to the participant who offers the best rebate.
5. We use preselected sequences across sessions to maximize comparability. See Cason and Friedman (1996) for discussion of the benefits of using a preselected sequence.
6. Each period is independent so that unfilled orders are withdrawn at the end of a period. An interesting issue for future research is to determine whether observed spreads are affected by (1) the presence of a limit book and (2) whether the information contained in the limit book is open to the public.
7. In our experiment it is possible for one participant to submit the best bid and ask prices in a particular period.
8. Inventory costs can significantly impact dealer behavior. With heterogeneous markets makers, a market maker who fills an order at an inside price he did not quote, will change his inventory in an undesirable fashion (Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan, 1997) . In order to focus on how preferencing impacts behavior, we remove uncertainty about the terminal value of the shares.
9. Participants' responses to the post-experiment questionnaire suggest that they found the experiment interesting and the monetary incentives motivating. Participants responded on a seven-point scale as to how interesting they found the experiment, where 1 = not very interesting and 7 = very interesting. The mean response was 5.61. Participants also responded on a sevenpoint scale as to how they would characterize the amount of money earned for taking part in the experiment, where 1 = nominal amount and 7 = considerable amount. The mean response was 5.17.
10. Although not formally presented here, we examined whether prices centered around $25, the final share value. We had no reason, a priori, to expect asymmetric deviations between bid and ask prices and the data indicate that bid and ask prices are evenly centered around $25 across sessions.
Endnotes

11.
Learning is likely to occur across the initial periods of each session as participants become familiar with the experimental procedures and the behavior of other group members.
12. Goswami, Noe, and Rebello's (1996) experimental evidence suggests that verbal communication among bidders in an auction setting leads to collusive behavior.
13. These results should be interpreted with caution because the observations are not independent over time.
14. Although not reported, the results are similar when the ANOVA is conducted using data from periods 7-24 and 13-24. Session 15, #334: I wanted to guarantee a minimum expected profit, so I didn't set the bid price very high, or the ask price very low. Also the bid and ask prices would get me around 50% of the offers.
Panel F: Sessions With Preferencing and Payment for Order Flow, With Communication
Session 16, #343: At the beginning of the experiment I just wanted some points below 25 for bids and some points above for ask price. On subsequent periods after setting a very high rebate and a very narrow margin, I decided to keep low rebates and set my prices according to past periods.
Session 17, #353: Observed bidding from previous periods ... it appeared that an informal agreement was made to set minimum price difference beyond which none of the other market makers would move.
Session 18, #361: Collusion with the other members. 
Panel A: Sessions Without Preferencing, Without Communication
Session 1, #231: Initially all members bid and asks outside of the $25 range. However, once members started crowding the 25 dollar figure, it was difficult to make $ therefore I attempted with others to move the price up and down to allow us to make more profit. But there were members who did not wish to move, thereby creating 24 rounds of bid 24 7/8 and ask 25 1/8. Overall, frustrating.
Session 2, #243: I tried to lead everybody verbally by asking specific questions and the way in which I announced my bid and ask. I felt that nobody else made an attempt at this, maybe one other guy. But it just ended up going down to the least one every time.
Session 3, #251: Without talking, hoping cooperation would occur so everyone can maximize earnings. However, competitive nature of business students is bad enough to want to beat others, even at the cost of self-sacrifice.
Panel B: Sessions Without Preferencing, With Communication
Session 4, #203: Don't think they wanted to cooperate, a few attempts seem to have failed.
Session 5, #213: We set the bid price of 24 2/8 and the ask of 25 6/8; tried to achieve a range that would generate a relatively high amount of cash, while at the same time achieving a range with approximately 50% probability of filling the market orders.
Session 6, #224: It became evident early on (actually about half way through) that cooperating would maximize the earnings of the group. We verbally agreed, and no one cheated.
Panel C: Sessions With Preferencing, Without Communication
Session 7, #133: No, I don't think it was cooperation, but once a pattern of holding the same bid started, the others started coming closer to my bid, which was the lowest bid and highest ask price.
Session 8, #142: I feel some of the other group members began to use the same strategy.
Session 9, #154: Staying within average bid and ask by +/-3/8.
Panel D: Sessions With Preferencing, With Communication
Session 10, #102: We tried to increase the spread in order to make money in larger amts for each transaction, it did not, however, work.
Session 11, #113: We determined a limit of what an appropriate bid and ask would be and then set levels in that range.
Session 12, #121: Verbal communication of prices. Not everyone stuck to price agreed upon but most of the time they stayed reasonably close.
